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Abstract
We describe a framework and equations used to model and predict the
behavior of multi-agent systems (MASs) with learning agents. A difference
equation is used for calculating the progression of an agent’s error in its
decision function, thereby telling us how the agent is expected to fare in
the MAS. The equation relies on parameters which capture the agent’s
learning abilities, such as its change rate, learning rate and retention rate,
as well as relevant aspects of the MAS such as the impact that agents
have on each other. We validate the framework with experimental results
using reinforcement learning agents in a market system, as well as with
other experimental results gathered from the AI literature. Finally, we
use PAC-theory to show how to calculate bounds on the values of the
learning parameters.
Multi-Agent Systems, Machine Learning, Complex Systems.
1 Introduction
With the steady increase in the number of multi-agent systems (MASs) with
learning agents [9, 5, 10, 31] the analysis of these systems is becoming increas-
ingly important. Some of the research in this area consists of experiments where
a number of learning agents are placed in a MAS, then different learning or sys-
tem parameters are varied and the results are gathered and analyzed in an
effort to determine how changes in the individual agent behaviors will affect the
system behavior. We have learned about the dynamics of market-based MASs
using this approach [34]. However, in this article we will take a step beyond
these observation-based experimental results and describe a framework that can
be used to model and predict the behavior of MASs with learning agents. We
give a difference equation that can be used to calculate the progression of an
c© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002.
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Figure 1: The agents in a MAS.
agent’s error in its decision function. The equation relies on the values of pa-
rameters which capture the agents’ learning abilities and the relevant aspects
of the MAS. We validate the framework by comparing its predictions with our
own experimental results and with experimental results gathered from the AI
literature. Finally, we show how to use probably approximately correct (PAC)
theory to get bounds on the values of some of the parameters.
The types of MAS we study are exemplified by the abstract representation
shown in Figure 1. We assume that the agents observe the physical state of
the world (denoted by w in the figure) and take some action (a) based on their
observation of the world state. An agent’s mapping from states to actions is
denoted by the decision function (δ) inside the agent. Notice that the “physical”
state of the world includes everything that is directly observable by the agent
using its sensors. It could include facts such as a robot’s position, or the set
outstanding bids in an auction, depending on the domain. The agent does not
know the decision functions of the other agents. After taking action an agent
can change its decision function as prescribed by whatever machine-learning
algorithm the agent is using.
We have a situation where agents are changing their decision function based
on the effectiveness of their actions. However, the effectiveness of their actions
depends on the other agents’ decision functions. This scenario leads to the
immediate problem: if all the agents are changing their decisions functions then
it is not clear what will happen to the system as a whole. Will the system
settle to some sort of equilibrium where all agents stop changing their decision
functions? How long will it take to converge? How do the agents’ learning
abilities influence the system’s behavior and possible convergence? These are
some of the questions we address in this article.
Section 2 presents our framework for describing an agent’s learning abilities
and the error in its behavior. Section 3 presents an equation that can be used
to predict an agent’s expected error, as a function of time, when the agent is
in a MAS composed of other learning agents. This equation is simplified in
Section 4 by making some assumptions about the type of MAS being modeled.
Section 5 then defines the last few parameters used in our framework—volatility
and impact. Section 6 gives an illustrative example of the use of the framework.
The predictions made by our framework are verified by our own experiments, as
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shown in Section 7, and with the experiments of others, as shown in Section 8.
The use of PAC theory for determining bounds on the learning parameters is
detailed in Section 9. Finally Section 10 describes some of the related work and
Section 12 summarizes our claims.
2 A Framework for Modeling MASs
In order to analyze the behaviors of agents in MASs composed of learning
agents, we must first construct a formal framework for describing these agents.
The framework must state any assumptions and simplifications it makes about
the world, the agents, and the agents’ behaviors. It must also be mathemati-
cally precise, so as to allow us to make quantitative predictions about expected
behaviors. Finally, the simplifications brought about because of the need for
mathematical precision should not be so constraining that they prevent the ap-
plicability of the framework to a wide variety of learning algorithms and different
types of MASs. We now describe our framework and explain the types of MASs
and learning behaviors that it can capture.
2.1 The World and its Agents
A MAS consists of a finite number of agents, actions, and world states. We
let N denote the finite set of agents in the system. W denotes the finite set of
world states. Each agent is assumed to have a set of perceptors (e.g., a camera,
microphone, bid queue) with which it can perceive the world. An agent uses is
sensors to “look” at the world and determine which world state w it is in; the
set of all these states is W . Ai, where |Ai| ≥ 2, denotes the finite set of actions
agent i ∈ N can take.
We assume discrete time, indexed in the various functions by the superscript
t, where t is an integer greater than or equal to 0. The assumption of discrete
time is made, for practical reasons, by a number of learning algorithms. It
means that, while the world might be continuous, the agents perceive and learn
in separate discrete time steps.
We also assume that there is only one world state w at each time, which all
the agents can perceive in its completeness. That is, we asume the enviroment
is accessible (as defined in [26, p46]). This assumption holds for market systems
in which all the actions of all the agents are perceived by all the agents, and
for software agent domains in which all the agents have access to the same
information. However, it might not hold for robotic domains where one agent’s
view of the world might be obscured by some physical obstacle. Even in such
domains, it is possible that there is a strong correlation between the states
perceived by each agent. These correlations could be used to create equivalency
classes over the agents’ perceived states, and these classes could then be used
as the states in W .
Finally, we assume the environment is determistic [26, p46]. That is, the
agents’ combined actions will always have the expected effect. Of course, agent
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New world wt ∈ D //Perceive world wt //Take action δi(w
t)

Learn
t←t+1
iiSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS Receive payoff
or feedback.
oo
Figure 2: Action/Learn loop for an agent.
i might not know what action agent j will take so i might not know the eventual
effect of its own individual action.
2.2 A Description of Agent Behavior
In the types of MASs we are modeling, every agent i perceives the state of the
world w and takes an action ai, at each time step. We assume that every agent’s
behavior, at each moment in time, can be described with a simple state-to-
action mapping. That is, an agent’s choice of action is solely determined by its
current state-to-action mapping and the current world w.
Formally, we say that agent i’s behavior is represented by a decision func-
tion (also known as a “policy” in control theory and a “strategy” in game
theory), given by δti : W → Ai. This function maps each state w ∈ W to the
action ai ∈ Ai that agent i will take in that state, at time t. This function can
effectively describe any agent that deterministically chooses its action based on
the state of the world. Notice that the decision function is indexed with the
time t. This allows us to represent agents that change their behavior.
The action agent i should take in each state w is given by the target func-
tion ∆ti : W → Ai, which also maps each state w ∈ W to an action ai ∈ Ai.
The agent does not have direct access to its target function. The target function
is used to determine how well an agent is doing. That is, it represents the “per-
fect” behavior for a given agent. An agent’s learning task is to get its decision
function to match its target function as much as possible.
Since the choice of action for agent i often depends on the actions of other
agents, the target function for i needs to take these actions into account. That
is, in order to generate ∆ti, one would need to know δ
t
j(w) for all j ∈ N−i and
w ∈ W . These δtj(w) functions tell us the actions that all the other agents will
take in every state w. For example, in order for one to determine what an agent
should bid in every world w of an auction-based market system, one will need
to know what the other agents will bid in every world w. One can use these
actions, along with the state w, in order to identify the best action for i to take.
An agent’s δti(w) can change over time, so that δ
t+1
i 6= δ
t
i . These changes
in an agent’s decision function reflect its learned knowledge. The agents in
the MASs we consider are engaged in the discrete action/learn loop shown in
Figure 2. The loop works as follows: At time t the agents perceive a world
wt ∈ W which is drawn from a fixed distribution D(w). They then each take
the action dictated by their δti functions; all of these actions are assumed to
be taken effectively in parallel. Lastly, they each receive a payoff which their
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respective learning algorithms use to change the δti so as to, hopefully, better
match ∆ti. By time t+ 1, the agents have new δ
t+1
i functions and are ready to
perceive the world again and repeat the loop. Notice that, at time t, an agent’s
∆ti is derived by taking into account the δ
t
j of all other agents j ∈ N−i.
We assume that D(w) is a fixed probability distribution from which we take
the worlds seen at each time. This assumption is not unreasonably limiting.
For example, in an economic domain where the new state is the new good being
offered, or in an episodic domain where the agents repeatedly engage in different
games (e.g. a Prisoner’s Dilemma competition) there is no correlation between
successive world states or between these states and the agents’ previous actions.
However, in a robotic domain one could argue that the new state of the world
will depend on the current state of the world; after all, the agents probably
move very little each time step.
Our measure of the correctness of an agent’s behavior is given by our error
measure. We define the error of agent i’s decision function δti(w) as
e(δti) =
∑
w∈W
D(w)Pr[δti(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)]
= Prw∈D[δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)].
(1)
e(δti) gives us the probability that agent i will take an incorrect action; it
is in keeping with the error definition used in computational learning theory
[17]. We use it to gauge how well agent i is performing. An error of 0 means
that the agent is taking all the actions dictated by its target function. An
error of 1 means that the agent never takes an action as dictated by its target
function. Each action the agent takes is either correct or incorrect, that is, it
either matches the target function or it does not. We do not model degrees of
incorrectness. However, since the error is defined as the average over all possible
world states, an agent that takes the correct action in most world states will
have a small error. Extending the theory to handle degrees of incorrectness is
one of the subjects of your continuing work, see Section 11. All the notation
from this section is summarized in Figure 3.
2.3 The Moving Target Function Problem
The learning problem the agent faces is to change its δti(w) so that it matches
∆ti(w). If we imagine the space of all possible decision functions, then agent i’s
δti and ∆
t
i will be two points in this space, as shown in Figure 4. The agent’s
learning problem can then be re-stated as the problem of moving its decision
function as close as possible to its target function, where the distance between
the two functions is given by the error e(δti). This is the traditional machine
learning problem.
However, once agents start to change their decision functions (i.e., change
their behaviors) the problem of learning becomes more complicated because
these changes might cause changes in the other agents’ target functions. We
end up with a moving target function, as seen in Figure 5. In these systems, it
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N the set of all agents, where i ∈ N is one particular agent.
W the set of possible states of the world, where w ∈ W is one particular
state.
Ai the set of all actions that agent i can take.
δti :W → Ai the decision function for agent i at time t. It tells which
action agent i will take in each world.
∆ti :W → Ai the target function for agent i at time t. It tells us what
action agent i should take. It takes into account the actions that
other agents will take.
e(δti) = Pr[δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) |w ∈ D] the error of agent i at time t. It is the
probability that i will take an incorrect action, given that the worlds
w are taken from the fixed probability distribution D.
Figure 3: Summary of notation used for describing a MAS and the agents in it.
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Figure 4: The traditional learning problem.
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is not clear if the error will ever reach 0 or, more generally, what the expected
error will be as time goes to infinity. Determining what will happen to an agent’s
error in such a system is what we call the moving target function problem,
which we address in this article. However, we will first need to define some
parameters that describe the capabilities of an agent’s learning algorithm.
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// ∆t+1i
Figure 5: The learning problem in learning MASs.
2.4 A Model of Learning Algorithms
An agent’s learning algorithm is responsible for changing δti into δ
t+1
i so that it
is a better match of ∆ti. Different machine learning algorithms will achieve this
match with different degrees of success. We have found a set of parameters that
can be used to model the effects of a wide range of learning algorithms. The
parameter are: Change rate, Learning rate, Retention rate, and Impact; and
they will be explained in this section, except for Impact which will be introduced
in Section 5. These parameters, along with the equations we provide, form the
CLRI framework (the letters correspond to the first letter of the parameters’
names).
After agent i takes an action and receives some payoff, it activates its learning
algorithm, as we showed in Figure 2. The learning algorithm is responsible for
using this payoff in order to change δti into δ
t+1
i , making δ
t+1
i match ∆
t
i as much
as possible. We can expect that for some w it was true that δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w),
while for some other w this was not the case. That is, some of the w → ai
mappings given by δti(w) might have been incorrect. In general, a learning
algorithm might affect both the correct and incorrect mappings. We will treat
these two cases separately.
We start by considering the incorrect mappings and define the change rate
of the agent as the probability that the agent will change at least one of its
incorrect mappings. Formally, we define the change rate ci for agent i as
∀w Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= δ
t
i(w) | δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] = ci. (2)
The change rate tells us the likelihood of the agent changing an incorrect
mapping into something else. This “something else” might be the correct action,
but it could also be another incorrect action. The probability that the agent
changes an incorrect mapping to the correct action is called the learning rate
of the agent. It is defined as li where
∀w Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] = li. (3)
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There are two constraints which must always be satisfied by these two rates.
Since changing to the correct mapping implies that a change was made, the
value of li must be less than or equal to ci, that is, li ≤ ci must always be true.
Also, if |Ai| = 2 then ci = li since there are only two actions available, so the
one that is not wrong must be right.
The complementary value for the learning rate is 1 − li and refers to the
probability that an incorrect mapping does not get changed to a correct one. An
example learning rate of li = .5 means that if agent i initially has all mappings
wrong it will make half of them match the original target function after the first
iteration.
We now consider the agent’s correct mappings and define the retention
rate as the probability that a correct mapping will stay correct in the next
iteration. The retention rate is given by ri where
∀w Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)]. = ri. (4)
We propose that the behavior of a wide variety of learning algorithms can be
captured (or at least approximated) using appropriate values for ci, li, and
ri. Notice, however, that these three rates claim that the w → a mappings
that change are independent of the w that was just seen. We can justify this
independence by noting that most learning algorithms usually perform some
form of generalization. That is, after observing one world state w and the
payoff associated with it, a typical learning algorithm is able to generalize what
it learned to some other world states. This generalization is reflected in the
fact that the change, learning, and retention rates apply to all w’s. However, a
more precise model would capture the fact that, in some learning algorithms,
the mapping for the world state that was just seen is more likely to change than
the mapping for any other world state.
The rates are not time dependent because we assume that agents use one
learning algorithm during their lifetimes. The rates capture the capabilities of
this learning algorithm and, therefore, do not need to vary over time.
Finally, we define volatility to mean the probability that the target function
will change from time t to time t+ 1. Formally, volatility is given by vi where
∀w Pr[∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] = vi (5)
In Section 5, we will show how to calculate vi in terms of the error of the other
agents. We will then see that volatility is not a constant but, instead, varies
with time.
3 Calculating the Agent’s Error
We now wish to write a difference equation that will let us calculate the agent’s
expected error, as defined in Eq. (1), at time t+1 given the error at time t and the
other parameters we have introduced. We can do this by observing that there
are two conditions that determine the new error: whether ∆t+1i (w) = ∆
t
i(w) or
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not, and whether δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w) or not. If we define a ≡ ∆
t+1
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w),
and b ≡ δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w), we can then say that we need to consider the four cases
where: a ∧ b, a ∧ ¬b, ¬a ∧ b, and ¬a ∧ ¬b. Formally, this implies that
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w)] =
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) ∧ a ∧ b] +Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) ∧ a ∧ ¬b]+
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) ∧ ¬a ∧ b] +Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬b],
(6)
since the four cases are exclusive of each other. Applying the chain rule of
probability, we can rewrite each of the four terms in order to get
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w)] = Pr[a ∧ b] ·Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) | a ∧ b]+
Pr[a ∧ ¬b] ·Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) | a ∧ ¬b]+
Pr[¬a ∧ b] ·Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) | ¬a ∧ b]+
Pr[¬a ∧ ¬b] ·Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) | ¬a ∧ ¬b].
(7)
We can now find values for these conditional probabilities. We start with the
first term where, after replacing the values of a and b, we find that
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) |∆
t+1
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w) ∧ δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] = 1− ri. (8)
Since the target function does not change from time t to t+1 and the agent was
correct at time t, the agent will also be correct at time t+ 1; unless it changes
its correct w → a mapping. The agent changes this mapping with probability
1− ri.
The value for the second conditional probability is
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) |∆
t+1
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w) ∧ δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] = 1− li. (9)
In this case the target function still stays the same but the agent was incorrect.
If the agent was incorrect then it will change its decision function to match
the target function with probability li. Therefore, the probability that it will
be incorrect next time is the probability that it does not make this change, or
1− li.
The third probability has a value of
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) |∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) ∧ δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)]
= (ri + (1− ri) · B)
(10)
In this case the agent was correct and the target function changes. This means
that if the agent retains the same mapping, which it does with probability ri,
then the agent will definitely be incorrect at time t+1. If it does not retain the
same mapping, which happens with probability 1− ri, then it will be incorrect
with probability B, where
B = Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w)|δ
t
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w) ∧∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)
∧ δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)].
(11)
9
Finally, the fourth conditional probability has a value of
Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w) |∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) ∧ δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)]
= (1 − ci)D + li + (ci − li)F,
(12)
where
D = Pr[δti(w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w)|δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) ∧∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] (13)
F = Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w)|δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) ∧∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) (14)
∧ δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) ∧ δ
t+1
i (w) 6= δ
t
i(w)].
This is the case where the target function changes and the agent was wrong.
We have to consider three possibilities. The first possibility is for the agent
not to change its decision function, which happens with probability 1− ci. The
probability that the agent will be incorrect in this case is given by D. The
second possibility, when the agent changes its mapping to the correct function,
has a probability of li and ensures that the agent will be incorrect the next time.
The third possibility happens, with probability ci − li when the agent changes
its mapping to an incorrect value. In this case, the probability that it will be
wrong next time is given by F .
We can substitute Eqs. (8), (9), (10), and (12) into Eq. (7), substitute the
values of a and b, and expand Pr[a ∧ b] into Pr[a | b] ·Pr[b], in order to get
E[e(δt+1i )] = E[
∑
w∈W
D(w)Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= ∆
t+1
i (w)]] =
∑
w∈W
D(w)(
Pr[∆t+1i (w) = ∆
t
i(w)|δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] · (1− ri)
+Pr[∆t+1i (w) = ∆
t
i(w)|δ
t
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] · (1− li)
+Pr[∆t+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)|δ
t
i (w) = ∆
t
i(w)]
·Pr[δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] · (ri + (1− ri) ·B)
+Pr[∆t+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)|δ
t
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)]
· (1 − ci)D + li + (ci − li)F.
(15)
Equation (15) will model any MAS whose agent learning can be described with
the parameters presented Section 2.4 and whose action/learn loop is the same
as we have described. We can use Eq. (15) to calculate the successive expected
errors for agent i, given values for all the parameters and probabilities. In the
next section we show how this is done in a simple example game.
3.1 The Matching game
In this matching game we have two agents i and j each of whom, in every
world w, wants to play the same action as the other one. Their set of actions is
Ai = Aj , where we assume |Ai| > 2 (for |Ai| = 2 the equation is simpler). After
every time step, the agents both learn and change their decision functions in
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accordance to their learning rates, retention rates, and change rates. Since the
agents are trying to match each other, in this game it is always true that ∆ti(w) =
δtj(w) and ∆
t
j(w) = δ
t
i(w). Given all this information, we can find values for
some of the probabilities in Eq. (15) (including values for Equations (11) (13)
(14)) and rewrite (see Appendix A for derivation) it as:
E[e(δt+1i )] =
∑
w∈W
D(w){rj ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] · (1− ri)
+ (1− cj) ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] · (1− li)
+ (1− rj) ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] ·
(
ri + (1 − ri) ·
(
|Ai| − 2
|Ai| − 1
))
+ cj ·Pr[δ
t
i(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] ·
(
1− lj +
cilj(|Ai| − 1) + li(1− lj)− ci
|Ai| − 2
)
}
(16)
We can better understand this equation by plugging in some values and sim-
plifying. For example, lets assume that ri = rj = 1 and li = lj = 1, which
implies that ci = cj = 1. This is the case where the two agents always change
all their incorrect mappings so as to match their respective target functions at
time t. That is, if we had δti(w1) = x and δ
t
j(w1) = y, then at time t+1 we will
have δt+1i (w1) = y and δ
t+1
j (w1) = x. This means that agent i changes all its
incorrect mappings to match j, while j changes to match i, so all the mappings
stay wrong after all (i.e., i ends up doing what j did before, while j does what
i did before). The error, therefore, stays the same. We can see this by plugging
the values into Eq. (16). The first three terms will become 0 and the fourth
term will simplify to the definition of error, as given by Eq. (1). Since the fourth
term is the only one that is non-zero, we end up with E[e(δt+1i )] = e(δ
t
i).
We can also let ci and li (keeping cj = lj = 1) be arbitrary numbers, which
gives us E[e(δt+1i )] = cie(δ
t
i). This tells us that the error will drop faster for
a smaller change rate ci. The reason is that i’s learning (remember li ≤ ci) in
this game is counter-productive because it is always made invalid by j’s learning
rate of 1. That is, since j is changing all its mappings to match i’s actions, i’s
best strategy is to keep its actions the same (i.e., ci = 0).
4 Further Simplification
We can further simplify Eq. (15) if we are willing to make two assumptions.
The first assumption is that the new actions chosen when either δti(w) changes
(and does not match the target), or when ∆ti(w) changes, are both taken from
flat probability distributions over Ai. By making this assumption we can find
values for B, D, and F , namely:
B = D =
|Ai| − 2
|Ai| − 1
F =
|Ai| − 3
|Ai| − 2
(17)
The second assumption we make is that the probability of ∆ti(w) changing,
for a particular w, is independent of the probability that δti(w) was correct.
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In Section 3.1 we saw that in the matching game the probabilities of ∆ti(w)
and δti(w) changing were correlated since, if δ
t
i(w) was wrong then δ
t
j(w) was
also wrong, which meant j would probably change δtj(w), which would change
∆ti(w).
However, the matching game is a degenerate example in exhibiting such tight
coupling between the agents’ target functions. In general, we can expect that
there will be a number of MASs where the probability that any two agents i and
j are correct is uncorrelated (or loosely correlated). For example, in a market
system all sellers try to bid what the buyer wants, so the fact that one seller
bids the correct amount says nothing about another seller’s bid. Their bids are
all uncorrelated. In fact, the Distributed Artificial Intelligence literature is full
of systems that try to make the agents’ decisions as loosely-coupled as possible
[19, 21].
This second assumption we are trying to make can be formally represented
by having Eq. (18) be true for all pairs of agents i and j in the system.
Pr[δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w) ∧ δ
t
j(w) = ∆
t
j(w)]
= Pr[δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] ·Pr[δ
t
j(w) = ∆
t
j(w)]
(18)
Once we make these two assumptions we can rewrite Eq. (15) as:
E[e(δt+1i )] =
∑
w∈W
D(w)(Pr[∆t+1i (w) = ∆
t
i(w)] · (Pr[δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] · (1− ri)
+Pr[δti(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] · (1− li))
+Pr[∆t+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] · (Pr[δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] ·
(
ri + (1− ri) ·
(
|Ai| − 2
|Ai| − 1
))
+Pr[δti(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] ·
(
|Ai| − 2− ci + 2li
|Ai| − 1
)
))
(19)
Some of the probabilities in this equation are just the definition of vi, and others
simplify to the agent’s error. This means that we can simplify Eq. (19) to:
E[e(δt+1i )] = 1− ri + vi
(
|Ai|ri − 1
|Ai| − 1
)
+ e(δti)
(
ri − li + vi
(
|Ai|(li − ri) + li − ci
|Ai| − 1
))
(20)
Eq. (20) is a difference equation that can be used to determine the expected
error of the agent at any time by simply using E[e(δt+1i )] as the e(δ
t
i) for the
next iteration. While it might look complicated, it is just the function for a line
y = mx + b where x = e(δti) and y = e(δ
t+1
i ). Using this observation, and the
fact that e(δt+1i ) will always be between 0 and 1, we can determine that the
final convergence point for the error is the point where Eq. (20) intersects the
line y = x. The only exception is if the slope equals −1, in which case we will
see the error oscillating between two points.
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ci = 1, li = .3, ri = 1, |Ai| = 20. We show the error function (e(δ
t+1
i )), as well
as its two components: learning and volatility. The line y = x allows us trace
the agent’s error as it starts at .95 and converges to .44.
By looking at Eq. (20) we can also determine that there are two “forces”
acting on the agent’s error: volatility and the agent’s learning abilities. The
volatility tends to increase the agent’s error past its current value while the
learning reduces it. We can better appreciate this effect by separating the vi
terms in Eq. (20) and plotting the vi terms (volatility) and the rest of the terms
(learning) as two separate lines. By definition, these will add up to the line
given by Eq. (20). We have plotted these three lines and traced a sample error
progression in Figure 6. The error starts at .95 and then decreases to eventually
converge to .44. We notice the learning curve always tries to reduce the agent’s
error, as confirmed by the fact that its line always falls below y = x. Meanwhile,
the volatility adds an extra error. This extra error is bigger when the agent’s
error is small since, any change in the target function is then likely to increase
the agent’s error.
5 Volatility and Impact
Equation (20) is useful for determining the agent’s error when we know the
volatility of the system. However, it is likely that this value is not available
to us (if we knew it we would already know a lot about the dynamics of the
system). In this section we determine the value of vi in terms of the other
agents’ changes in their decision functions. That is, in terms of Pr[δt+1j 6= δ
t
j ],
for all other agents j.
In order to do this we first need to define the impact Iji that agent j’s
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changes in its decision function have on i’s target function.
∀w∈W Iji = Pr[∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t+1
j (w) 6= δ
t
j(w)] (21)
We can now start to define volatility by first determining that, for two agents
i and j
∀w∈W v
t
i = Pr[∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)]
= Pr[∆t+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t+1
j (w) 6= δ
t
j(w)] ·Pr[δ
t+1
j (w) 6= δ
t
j(w)]
+Pr[∆t+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t+1
j (w) = δ
t
j(w)] ·Pr[δ
t+1
j (w) = δ
t
j(w)].
(22)
The reader should notice that volatility is no longer constant; it varies
with time (as recorded by the superscript). The first conditional probability
in Eq. (22) is just Iji. The second one we will set to 0, since we are specifically
interested in MASs where the volatility arises only as a side-effect of the other
agents’ learning. That is, we assume that agent i’s target function changes only
when j’s decision function changes. For cases with more than two agents, we
similarly assume that one agent’s target function changes only when some other
agent’s decision function changes. That is, we ignore the possibility that outside
influences might change an agent’s target function.
We can simplify Eq. (22) and generalize it to N agents, under the assumption
that the other agents’ changes in their decision functions will not cancel each
other out, making ∆ti stay the same as a consequence. v
t
i then becomes
∀w∈W v
t
i = Pr[∆
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)]
= 1−
∏
j∈N
−i
(1− IjiPr[δ
t+1
j (w) 6= δ
t
j(w)]).
(23)
We now need to determine the expected value of Pr[δt+1j (w) 6= δ
t
j(w)] for
any agent. Using i instead of j we have
∀w∈W Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= δ
t
i(w)]
= Pr[δti(w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] ·Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)]
+Pr[δti(w) = ∆
t
i(w)] ·Pr[δ
t+1
i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w) | δ
t
i(w) = ∆
t
i(w)],
(24)
where the expected value is:
E[Pr[δt+1i (w) 6= δ
t
i(w)]] = cie(δ
t
i) + (1 − ri) · (1− e(δ
t
i)). (25)
We can then plug Eq. (25) into Eq. (23) in order to get the expected volatility
E[vti ] = 1−
∏
j∈N
−i
1− Iji(cje(δ
t
j) + (1− rj) · (1 − e(δ
t
j))). (26)
We can use this expected value of vti in Eq. (20) in order to find out how the
other agents’ learning will affect agent i. In MASs that have identical learning
agents (i.e., their c, l, r, and I rates are all the same and they start with the
same initial error) we can replace the multiplier in Eq. (26) with an exponent
of |N | − 1. We use this simplification later in Section 8.2.
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6 An Example with Two Agents
In a MAS with just two agents i and j, we can use Eq. (26) to rewrite Eq. (20)
as
E[e(δt+1i )] = 1− ri + Iji(cje(δ
t
j) + (1 − rj) · (1 − e(δ
t
j)))
(
|Ai|ri − 1
|Ai| − 1
)
+ e(δti){ri − li + Iji(cje(δ
t
j) + (1 − rj) · (1 − e(δ
t
j)))
·
(
|Ai|(li − ri) + li − ci
|Ai| − 1
)
}.
(27)
We can now use Eq. (27) to plot values for one particular example. Let us
say that li = lj = .2, ci = cj = 1, ri = rj = 1, |Aj | = |Ai| = 20 and we let
the impacts Iij and Iji vary between zero and one. Figure 7 shows the final
error, after convergence, for this situation. It shows an area where the error is
expected to be below .1, corresponding to low values for either Iij , Iji or both.
This area represents MASs that are loosely coupled, i.e., one agent’s change
in behavior does not significantly affect the other’s target function. In these
systems we can expect that the error will eventually1 reach a value close to zero.
We see that as the impact increases the final error also increases, with a fairly
abrupt transition between a final error of 0 and bigger final errors. This abrupt
transition is characteristic of these types of systems where there are tendencies
for the system to either converge or diverge, and both of them are self-enforcing
behaviors. Notice also that the graph is not symmetric—Iij has more weight in
determining i’s final error than Iji. This result seems counterintuitive, until we
realize that it is j’s error that makes it hard for i to converge to a small error.
1Notice that we are not representing how long it takes for the error to converge. This can
easily be done and is just one more of the parameters our theory allows us to explore.
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If Iij is high then, if i has a large error then j’s error will increase, which will
make j change its decision function often and make it hard for i to reduce its
error. If Iij is low then, even if Iji is high, j will probably settle down to a low
error and as it does i will also be able to settle down to a low error.
If we were about to design a MAS we would try to build it so that it lies
in the area where the final error is zero. This way we can expect all agents to
eventually have the correct behavior. We note that a substantial percentage of
the research in DAI and MAS deals with taking systems that are not inherently
in this area of near-zero error and designing protocols and rules of encounter so
as to move them into this area, as in [25].
The fact that the final error is 1 for the case with Iij = Iji = 1 can seem
non-intuitive to readers familiar with game theory. In game theory there are
many games, such as the “matching game” from Section 3.1, where two agents
have an impact of 1 on each other. However, it is known [3] that, in these
games, two learning agents will eventually converge to one of the equilibria (if
there are any), making their final error equal to 0. This is certainly true, and
it is exactly what we showed in Section 3.1. The same result is not seen in
Figure 7 because the figure was plotted using our simplified Equation. (20),
which makes the simplifying independence assumption given by Eq. (18). This
assumption cannot be made in games such as the matching game because, in
these games, there is a correlation between the correctness of each of the agents
actions. Specifically, in the matching game it is always true that both agents are
either correct, or incorrect, but it is never true that one of them is correct while
the other one is incorrect, i.e., either they matched, or they did not match.
Another view of the system is given by Figure 8 which shows a vector plot
16
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PSfrag replacements
αj = .1
αj = .3
αj = .9
lj = .005
lj = .04
lj = .055
time
e
r
r
o
r
(a) Experiment
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PSfrag replacements
αj = .1
αj = .3
αj = .9
lj = .005
lj = .04
lj = .055
time
e
r
r
o
r
(b) Theory
Figure 9: Comparison of observed and predicted error.
of the agents’ errors. We can see how the bigger errors are quickly reduced but
the pace of learning decreases as the errors get closer to the convergence point.
Notice also that an agent’s error need not change in a monotonic fashion. That
is, an agent’s error can get bigger for a while before it starts to get smaller.
7 A Simple Application
In order to demonstrate how our theory can be used, we tested it on a simple
market-based MAS. The game consists of three agents, one buyer and two seller
agents i and j. The buyer will always buy at the cheapest price—but the sellers
do not know this fact. In each time step the sellers post a price and the buyer
decides which of the sellers to buy from, namely, the one with the lowest bid.
The sellers can bid any one of 20 prices in an effort to maximize their profits.
The sellers use a reinforcement learning algorithm with their reinforcements
being the profit the agent achieved in each round, or 0 if it did not sell the good
at the time. In this system we had one good being sold (|W | = 1).As predicted
by economic theory, the price in this system settles to the sellers’ marginal cost,
but it takes time to get there due to the learning inefficiencies.
We experimented with different αj rates
2 for the reinforcement learning of
agent j, while keeping αi = .1 fixed, and plotted the running average of the
error of agent i. A comparison is shown in Figure 9. Figure 9(a) gives the
experimental results for three different values of αj . It shows i’s average error,
over 100 runs, as a function of time. Since both sellers start with no knowledge,
their initial actions are completely random which makes their error equal to .5.
2
α is the relative weight the algorithm gives to the most recent payoff. α = 1 means that
it will forget all previous experience and use only the latest payoff to determine what action
to take.
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Then, depending on αj , i’s error will either start to go down from there or will
first go up some and then down. Eventually, i’s error gets very close to 0, as
the system reaches a market equilibrium.
We can predict this behavior using Eq. (27). Based on the game description,
we set |Ai| = |Aj | = 20, since there were 20 possible actions. We let ri =
rj = 1 because reinforcement learning with fixed payoffs enforces the condition
that once an agent is taking the correct action it will never change its decision
function to take a different action. The agent might, however, still take a wrong
action but only when its exploration rate dictates it.
We then let Iij = Iji = .17 based on the rough calculation that each agent
has an equal probability of bidding any one of the 20 prices. If ∆ti = 20 then
Iji for this situation is the probability that j was also bidding 20 or above,
i.e., 1/20, times the probability that j’s new price is lower than 20, i.e. 19/20.
Similarly, if ∆ti = 19 then Iji is equal to 2/20 times 18/20. The average of all
of these probabilities is .17. A more precise calculation of the impact would
require us to find it via experimentation by actually running the system.
Finally, we chose li = lj = ci = cj = .005 for the first curve (i.e., the one that
compares with αj = .1). We knew that for such a low αj the learning and change
rate should be the same. The actual value was chosen via experimentation. The
resulting curve is shown in Figure 9(b). At this moment, we do not possess a
formal way of deriving learning and change rates from α-rates.
For the second curve (αj = .3) we knew that, since only αj had changed
from the first experiment, we should only change lj and cj . In fact, these
two values should only be increased. We found their exact values, again by
experimentation, to be lj = .04, cj = .4. For the third curve we found the
values to be lj = .055, cj = .8.
One difference we notice between the experimental and the theoretical results
is that the experimental results show a longer delay before the error starts to
decrease. We attribute this delay to the agent’s initially high exploration rate.
That is, the agents initially start by taking all random actions but progressively
reduce this rate of exploration. As the exploration rate decreases the discrepancy
between our theoretical predictions and experimental results is reduced.
In summary, while it is true that we found lj and cj by experimentation,
all the other values were calculated from the description of the problem. Even
the relative values of lj and cj follow the intuitive relation with αj that, as
αj increases so does lj and (even more) cj . Section 9 shows how to calculate
lower bounds on the learning rate. We believe that this experiment provides
solid evidence that our theory can be used to approximately determine the
quantitative behaviors of MASs with learning agents.
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Figure 10: Comparing theory (b) with results from [6] (a).
8 Application of our Theory to Experiments in
the Literature
In this section we show how we can apply our theory to experimental results
found in the AI and MAS literature. While we will often not be able to com-
pletely reproduce the authors’ results exactly, we believe that being able to
reproduce the flavor and the main quantitative characteristics of experimental
results in the literature shows that our theory can be widely applied and used
by practitioners in this area of research.
8.1 Claus and Boutilier
Claus and Boutilier [6] study the dynamics of a system that contains two re-
inforcement learning agents. Their first experiment puts the two agents in a
matching game exactly like the one we describe in Section 3.1 with |Ai| =
|Aj | = 2. Their results show the probability that both agents matched (i.e., 1
- e(δti)) as time progressed. Since they were using two reinforcement learning
agents, it was not surprising that the curve they saw, seen in Figure 10(a), was
nearly identical to the curve we saw in our experiments with the two buying
agents (Figure 9(a) with αj = αi = .1, except upside-down).
We can reproduce their curve using our equation for the matching game
Eq. (16). The results can be seen in Figure 10(b). Our theory again fails to
account for the initial exploration rate. We can, however, confirm that by time
15 their Boltzmann temperature (the authors used Boltzmann exploration) had
been reduced from an initial value of 16 to 3.29 and would keep decreasing by
a factor of .9 each time step. This means that by time 15 the agents were,
indeed, starting to do more exploitation (i.e., reduce their error) while doing
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Figure 11: Comparing theory (b) with results from [30] (a).
little exploration.
8.2 Shoham and Tennenholtz
Shohan and Tennenholtz [30] investigate how learning agents might arrive at
social conventions. The authors introduce a simple learning algorithm (strategy-
selection rule) called highest cumulative reward (HCR) which their agents use for
learning these conventions. Shoham and Tennenholtz also provide the results of
a series of experiments using populations of learning agents. We try to reproduce
the results they present in their Section 4.1 where they study the “coordination
game” which is similar to our matching game, but with only two actions.
The experiment in question involves 100 agents, all of them identical and all
of them using HCR. At each time instant the agents take one of two available
actions. The aim is for every pair of chosen agents to take the same action
as each other. Agents are randomly made to form pairs. The agents update
their behavior (i.e., apply HCR) after a given delay. The authors try a series
of delays (from 0 to 200) and show that increasing the update delay decreases
the percentage of trials where, after 1600 iterations, at least 95% of the agents
reached a convention. The authors show surprise at finding this phenomenon.
Their results are reproduced in Figure 11(a) (cf. Figure 1 in their article).
The number of actions for all agents is easily set to |Ai| = 2, which implies that
we must have li = ci. By examining HCR, it is easy to determine that ri = 1
(i.e if an agent took the right action, it will only get more support for it). At
first intuition, one’s impulse is to set Iij = 1 for every pair of agents i and j.
However, since there are 100 of them and only pairs of them interact at every
time instant, the real impact is Iij = 1/99.
We will now convert from their units of measurement into ours. In Fig-
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ure 11(a) we can see that their x-axis is called the update delay, which we will
refer to as d. This value is the number of time units that pass before the agent
is allowed to learn. For d = 0 the agent learns after every interaction (i.e., on
every time t), while for d = 200 the agent takes the same action for 200 time in-
stances and only learns after every 200 iterations. This means that we must set
li =
1
p(d+1) where p > 0. The value of p depends on their learning algorithm’s
performance, but we know that it must be a small number (< 50) greater than
0. Through some experimentation we settled on p = 6 (other values close to
this one give similar results). Since in their graph they look at 0 ≤ d ≤ 200, we
must then look at li where
1
1206 ≤ li ≤
1
6 Finally, we find the value of d in terms
of li to be
d =
1
pli
− 1 (28)
The y-axis of Figure 11(a) is the success, i.e., number of trials, out of 4000,
where at least 95% of the agents reached a convention. We will refer to this
value as s. We know that in s/4000 of the trials at least 95% of the agents have
error close to 0 (i.e., reaching a convention means that the agents take the right
action almost all the time), and for the rest of the trials the error was greater.
We can approximately map this to an error by saying that in s/4000 of the trials
the error was 0 (a slight underestimate), while in 1 − s/4000 of the trials the
error was 1 (a slight overestimate). We add these two up (the 0 makes the first
term disappear) and arrive at an equation that maps s to e(δti).
e(δti) ≈
(
4000− s
4000
)
(29)
The mapping from d to s is given by their actual data. Their data can be
fit by the following function:
s = 3900− 4d−
(d− 100)2
100
(30)
Plugging Eq. (28) into Eq. (30), and the result into Eq. (29), we finally arrive
at a function that maps their experimental results into our units:
Final error =
4000−
(
3900− 4(1/pli − 1)−
(
(1/pli−1−100)
2
100
))
4000
(31)
for the range 11206 ≤ li ≤
1
6 .
Now that we have values for ci, li, ri, Iij , |Ai|, a range for li and an equation
that maps their experimental results into our units, we can plot both functions,
as seen in Figure 11(b). The x-axis was plotted on a log-scale in order to better
show the shape of the experiment curve, otherwise it would appear mostly as a
straight line. For our theory curve we used Equations (20) and (26), and iterated
for 1600 time units, just like in the experiment, and plotted the error at that
point. For the experiment curve we used Eq. (31). We plotted both of these
curves in the specified range for li. The reader will notice that our theory was
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able to make precise quantitative predictions. The maximum distance from our
theory curve to the experimental curve is .05, which means that our predictions
for the final error were, at worst, within 5% of the experimental values. Also, an
error of about 5% was introduced when mapping from their success percentage
s to our error.
8.3 Others
There are several other examples in the literature where we believe our theory
can be successfully applied. [16, chapter 3.7] gives results of an experiment
where two agents try to find each other in a 100 by 100 grid. He shows that if
the grid has few obstacles it is faster if both agents move towards each other,
while if there are many obstacles it is faster if one of the agents stays still
while the other one searches for it. We believe that the number of obstacles is
proportional to the change rate that the agents experience and, perhaps, to the
impact that they have on each other. When there are no obstacles the agents
never change their decision functions (because their initial Manhattan heuristics
lead them in the correct path). As the number of obstacles increases, the agents
will start to change their decision functions as they move, which will have an
impact on the other agent’s target function. If, however, one of them stays put,
this means that his change rate is 0 so the other agent’s target function will
stay still and he will be able to reach his target (i.e., error 0) quicker.
Notice that the problem of a moving target that Ishida studies is different
from the problem of a moving target function which we study. It is, however,
interesting to note their similarities and how our theory can be applied to some
aspects of that domain.
Another possible example is given by [29]. They show two Q-learning agents
trying to cooperate in order to move a block. The authors show how different α
rates (β in their article) affect the quality of the result that the agents converge
to. This quality roughly corresponds to our error, except for the fact that their
measurements implicitly consider some actions to be better than others, while
we consider an action to be either correct or incorrect. This discrepancy would
make it harder to apply our theory to their results but we still believe that a
rough approximation is possible. Our future work includes the extension of the
CLRI framework to handle a more general definition of error—one that attaches
a utility to each state-action pair, rather than the simple correct/incorrect cat-
egorization we use.
9 Bounding the Learning Rate with Sample Com-
plexity
In the previous examples we have used our knowledge of the learning algorithms
to determine the values of the agent’s ci, li, and ri parameters. However, there
might be cases where this is not possible—the learning algorithm might be too
complicated or unknown. It would be useful, in these cases, to have some other
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measure of the agent’s learning abilities, which could be used to determine some
bounds on the values of these parameters.
One popular measure of the complexity of learning is given by Probably
Approximately Correct (PAC) theory [17], in the form of a measure called the
sample complexity. The sample complexity gives us a loose upper bound on
the number of examples that a consistent learning agent must observe before
arriving at a PAC hypothesis.
There are two important assumptions made by PAC-theory. The first as-
sumption is that the agents are consistent learners3. Using our notation, a
consistent learner is one who, once it has learned a correct w → a mapping does
not forget it. This simply means that the agent must have ri = 1. The second
assumption is that the agent is trying to learn a fixed concept. This assumption
makes ∆t+1i = ∆
t
i true for all t.
The sample complexity m of an agent’s learning problem is given by
m ≥
1
ǫ
(
ln
|H |
γ
)
, (32)
where |H | is the size of the hypothesis space for the agent. In other words, |H |
is the total number of different δi(w) functions that the agent will consider. For
an agent with no previous knowledge we have |H | = |Ai|
|W |. However, agents
with previous knowledge might have smaller |H |, since this knowledge might be
used to eliminate impossible mappings. If a consistent learning agent has seen
m examples then, with probability at least (1− γ), it has error at most ǫ.
While we cannot map the sample complexity m to a particular learning rate
li, we can use it to put a lower bound on the learning rate for a consistent
learning agent. That is, we can find a lower bound for the learning rate of an
agent who does not forget anything it has seen, and who is trying to learn a
fixed target function. Since the agent does not forget anything it has seen, we
can deduce that its retention rate must be ri = 1. Since the target function
is not changing, we know that Pr[∆t+1i (w) 6= ∆
t
i(w)] = 0 and Pr[∆
t+1
i (w) =
∆ti(w)] = 1. We can plug these values into Eq. (19) and simplify in order to
get:
E[e(δt+1i )] = e(δ
t
i) · (1 − li). (33)
We can solve the difference Eq. (33), for any time n, in order to get:
E[e(δni )] = e(δ
0
i ) · (1− li)
n. (34)
We now remember that after m time steps we expect, with probability (1− γ),
the error to be less than ǫ. Since Eq. (34) only gives us an expected error,
not a probability distribution over errors, we cannot use it to calculate the
likelihood of the agent having that expected error. That is, we cannot calculate
the “probably” (γ) part of probably approximately correct. We will, therefore,
assume that the γ chosen for m is small enough so that it will be safe to say
that, after m time steps, the error is less than ǫ. In a typical application one
3See [24, p162] for a formal definition of a consistent learner.
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uses a small γ because it guarantees a high degree of certainty on the upper
bound of the error.
Since we can now safely say that, after m time steps, the error is less than ǫ,
we can then deduce that the li for this agent should be small enough such that,
if n = m, then E[e(δni )] ≤ ǫ. This is expressed mathematically as:
e(δ0i ) · (1− li)
m ≤ ǫ. (35)
We solve this equation for li in order to get:
li ≥ 1−
(
ǫ
e(δ0i )
)1/m
. (36)
This equation is not defined for e(δ0i ) = 0. However, given our assumption of
a fixed target function and ri = 1, we already know, from Eq. (33), that if an
agent starts with an error of 0 it will maintain this error of 0 for any future time
t > 0. Therefore, in this case, the choice of a learning rate has no bearing on
the agent’s error, which will always be 0.
Equation (36) gives us a lower bound on the learning rate that a consistent
learner must have, given that it has sample complexity m, and based on an
error ǫ and a sufficiently small γ. A designer of an agent that uses a reason-
able learning algorithm can expect that, if his agent has sample complexity m
(for ǫ error), then his agent will have a learning rate of at least li, as given by
Eq. (36). Furthermore, if a designer is comparing two possible agent designs,
each with a different sample complexity but both with similarly powerful learn-
ing algorithms, he can calculate bounds on the learning rates of both agents
and compare their relative performance.
10 Related Work
The topic of agents learning about agents arises often in the studies of com-
plexity [7]. In fact, systems where the agents try to adapt to endogenously
created dynamics are being widely studied [15, 2]. In these systems, like in
ours, the agents co-create their expectations as they learn and change their be-
haviors. Complexity research uses simulated agents in an effort to understand
the complex behaviors of these systems as observed in the real world.
One example is the work of Arthur et. al. [2], who arrive at the conclusion
that systems of adaptive agents, where the agents are allowed to change the
complexity of their learning algorithms, end up in one of two regimes: a sta-
ble/simple regime where it is trivial to predict an agent’s future behavior, and a
complex regime where the agents’ behaviors are very complex. It is this second
regime that interests complexity researchers the most. In it, the agents are able
to reach some kind of “equilibrium” point in model building complexity. These
same results are echoed by Darley and Kauffman [8] in a similar experiment. In
this article we have not allowed the agents to dynamically change the complex-
ity of their learning algorithms. Therefore, our dynamics are simpler. Allowing
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the agents to change their complexity amounts to allowing them to change the
values of their c, l, and r parameters while learning.
However, while complexity research is very important and inspiring, it is only
partially relevant to our work. Our emphasis is on finding ways to predict the
behavior of MASs composed of machine-learning agents. We are only concerned
with the behavior of simpler artificial programmable agents, rather than the
complex behavior of humans or the unpredictable behavior of animals.
The dynamics of MASs have also been studied by Kephart et. al. [18]. In
this work the authors show how simple predictive agents can lead to globally
cyclic or chaotic behaviors. As the authors explain, the chaotic behaviors were a
result of the simple predictive strategies used by the agents. Unlike our agents,
most of their agents are not engaged in learning, instead they use simple fixed
predictive strategies, such as “if the state of the world was x ten time units
before, then it will be x next time so take action a”. The authors later show
how learning can be used to eliminate these chaotic global fluctuations.
Mataric´ [22] has studied reinforcement learning in multi-robot domains. She
notes, for example, how learning can give rise to social behaviors [23]. The
work shows how robots can be individually programmed to produce certain
group behaviors. It represents a good example of the usefulness and flexibility
of learning agents in multi-agent domains. However, the author does not offer
a mathematical justification for the chosen individual learning algorithms, nor
does she explain why the agents were able to converge to the global behaviors.
Our research hopes to provide the first steps in this direction.
One particularly interesting approach is taken by Carmel and Markovitch
[4]. They work on model-based learning, that is, agents build models of other
agents via observations. They use models based on finite state machines. The
authors show how some of these models can be effectively learned via observation
of the other agent’s actions. The authors concentrate on the development of
learning algorithms that would let one agent learn a finite-state machine model
of another agent. They have not considered the case where two or more agents
are simultaneously learning about each other, which we study in this article.
However, their work is more general in the sense that they model agents as
state machines, rather than the state-action pairs we use.
Finally, a lot of experimental work has been done in the area of agents
learning about agents [27, 36]. For example, Sen and Sekaran [28] show how
learning agents in simple MAS converge to system-wide optimal behavior. Their
agents use Q-learning or modified classifier systems in order to learn. The
authors implement these agents and compare the performance of the different
learning algorithms for developing agent coordination. Hu and Wellman [14, 12]
have studied reinforcement learning in market-base MASs, showing how certain
initial learning biases can be self-fulfilling, and how learning can be useful but
is affected by an agent’s models of other agents. Claus and Boutilier [6] have
also carried out experimental studies of the behavior of reinforcement learning
agents. We have been able to use the CLRI framework to predict some of their
experimental results [33]. Other researchers [32, 20, 13] have extended the basic
Q-learning [35] algorithm for use with MASs in an effort to either improve or
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prove convergence to the optimal behavior.
We have also successfully experimented with reinforcement learning simula-
tions [34], but we believe that the formal treatment elucidated in these pages
will shed more light into the real nature of the problem and the relative im-
portance of the various parameters that describe the capabilities of an agent’s
learning algorithm.
11 Limitations and Future Work
The CLRI framework places some constraints on the type of systems it can
model, which limits its usability. However, it is important to understand that,
as we remove the limitations from the CLRI framework, the dynamics of the
system become much harder to predict. In the extreme, without any limitations
on the agents’ abilities, the system becomes a complex adaptive system, as
studied by Holland [11] and others in the field of complexity. The dynamic
behavior of these systems continues to be studied by complexity researchers
with only modest progress. It is only by placing limitations on the system that
we were able to predict the expected error of agents in the systems modeled by
the CLRI framework.
Our ongoing work involves the relaxation of some of the constraints made by
the CLRI framework so that it may become more easily and widely applicable,
without making the system dynamics impossible to analyze. We are targeting
three specific constraints.
1. The values of ci, li, ri, and Iij cannot, in all situations, be mathematically
determined from the system’s description. We have found that bounds for
the ci, li, and ri values can often be determined when using reinforcement
learning or supervised learning. However, the bounds are often very loose.
The values of the Iij parameter depend on the particular system. Some-
times it is trivial to calculate the impact, sometimes it requires extensive
simulation.
2. The CLRI framework assumes that an agent’s action is either correct or
incorrect. The framework does not allow degrees of correctness. Specifi-
cally, in many systems the agents can often take several actions, any one
of which is equally good. When modeling these systems, the CLRI frame-
work requires the user to designate one of those actions as the correct one,
thereby ignoring some possibly useful information.
3. The world states are taken from a uniform probability distribution which
does not change over time. The environment is assumed to be episodic.
As such, the framework is limited in the type of domains it can effectively
describe.
We are attacking these challenges with some of the same tools used by re-
searchers in complex adaptive systems, namely, agent-based simulations and
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co-evolving utility landscapes. We believe we can gain some insight into the dy-
namics of adaptive MASs by constructing and analyzing various types of MASs.
We also believe that the next step for the CLRI framework is the replacement of
the current error definition with a utility function. The agents can then be seen
as searching for the maximum value in the changing utility landscape defined
by their utility function. The degree to which the agents are successful on their
climb to the landscape peaks depends on the abilities of their learning algo-
rithm (change rate, learning rate, and retention rate), and the speed at which
the landscape changes as the other agents change their behavior (impact).
The use of utility landscapes will allow us to consider an agent’s utility
for any particular action, rather than simply considering whether an action is
correct or incorrect. The landscapes will also allow us to consider systems where
agents cannot travel between any two world states in one time step. That is, the
agents’ moves on the landscape will be constrained in the same manner as their
actions or behaviors are constrained the actual system. Finally, the new theory
will likely need to redefine the CLRI parameters. We hope the new parameters
will be easy to derive directly from the values that govern the machine-learning
algorithms’ behavior. These extensions will make the new theory applicable to
a much wider set of domains.
12 Summary
We have presented a framework for studying and predicting the behavior of
MASs composed of learning agents. We believe that this framework captures the
most important parameters that describe an agents’ learning and the system’s
rules of encounter. Various comparisons between the framework’s predictions
and experimental results were given. These comparisons showed that the theo-
retical predictions closely match our experimental results and the experimental
results published by others. Our success in reproducing these results allows us
to confidently state the effectiveness and accuracy of our theory in predicting
the expected error of machine learning agents in MASs.
Since our theory describes an agent’s behavior at a high-level (i.e., the agent’s
error), it is not capable of making system-specific predictions (e.g., predicting
the particular actions that are favored). These types of system-specific predic-
tions can only be arrived at by the traditional method of implementing popula-
tions of such agents and testing their behaviors. However, we expect that there
will be times when the predictions from our theory will be enough to answer a
designer’s questions. A MAS designer that only needs to determine how “good”
the agent’s behavior will be could probably use the CLRI framework. A de-
signer that needs to know which particular emergent behaviors will be favored
by his agents will need to implement the agents.
Finally, while we have given some examples as to how learning rates can be
determined for particular machine learning implementations, we do not have
any general method for determining these rates. However, we showed how to
use the sample complexity of a learning problem to determine a lower bound on
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the learning rate of a consistent learning agent. This bound is useful for quickly
ruling out the possibility of having agents with high expected errors and of
stating that an agent’s expected error will be, at most, a certain constant value.
Still, if the agent’s learning algorithm is much better than the one assumed by
a consistent learner (e.g., the agent is very good at generalizing from one world
state to many others), then these lower bounds could be significantly inaccurate.
A Derivation for Matching Game
If we can assume that the action chosen when an agent changes δti(w) and the
result does not match ∆ti(w) (for some specific w) is taken from a flat probability
distribution, then we can say that:
B =
|Ai| − 2
|Ai| − 1
. (37)
We will now show how to calculate the fourth term in (16). For the matching
game we find that we can set:
D = 1− lj (38)
F = lj + (1− lj)
(
|Ai| − 3
|Ai| − 2
)
. (39)
Having |Ai| = 2 implies that ci = li, this means that for this case we have
(1− ci)D + li + (ci − li)F = li + (1− ci)(1 − lj). (40)
For the case where |Ai| > 2, which is the case we are interested in, we can
plug in the values for D and F and simplify, in order to get the fourth term:
(1 − ci)D + li + (ci − li)F = 1− lj +
cilj(|Ai| − 1) + li(1 − lj)− ci
|Ai| − 2
. (41)
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